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Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic
Development
Daniel M. Klerman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence and effective courts are generally considered to be
factors that lead to economic growth, but the theoretical underpinnings of this
idea are surprisingly ambiguous, and it has proven very difficult to measure the
impact of the judiciary on economic growth. In general, this article argues that
economic theory supports the idea that judicial independence facilitates
economic growth. Independent courts enforce contracts and protect property
rights, and by doing so, they encourage the investment that is crucial for
economic development. Nevertheless, judicial independence is not necessary to
investment. There are other mechanisms that can enforce contracts and protect
property, albeit perhaps not as well as courts. For example, contracts can be
enforced by reputation, without recourse to the courts. Similarly, the government
can protect property rights through executive restraint and policing, even if
constitutional protections are weak and private litigation is ineffective. Thus,
economic growth often starts without a strong court system, and efforts to
improve the quality of the judiciary are often the consequence, rather than the
cause, of economic development.
The empirical literature, to the extent that it has investigated the relationship
between courts and economic growth, has focused on judicial independence.
Independence is, of course, only one aspect of a judicial system. Nevertheless, it
is relatively easy to measure and probably is correlated to other indices of court
quality. It thus serves as a rough proxy for the quality of legal infrastructure.
There is some evidence that judicial independence is associated with economic
growth, but that evidence is mixed and causation is unclear. It remains possible
that economic growth causes judicial independence. Much work remains to be
accomplished, including more accurate measurement of judicial independence
and more emphasis on change over time to distinguish between causation and
correlation.
This article will attempt three tasks. First, it will explore the theoretical
relationship between judicial independence and economic growth. Second, it will
review and critique the empirical literature on the relationship between judicial
independence and economic growth. Lastly, it will suggest promising avenues for
future research.
* Professor of Law & History, USC Law School. The author may be contacted at dklerman@law.
usc.edu and has a website at www.klerman.com. The author thanks Susan Franck, Edward Glaeser, Bruce
Janigian, Paul Mahoney, Stefan Voigt, Laura Young, and participants in the University of Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law, Symposium on Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure for their comments, criticism,
and suggestions.
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II. THEORY
Economic growth requires many kinds of investment. It requires time and
effort because growth is impossible if people are unwilling to work hard.
Investment in human capital is also essential, because an educated, skilled
population is a prerequisite to the production of all but the most basic goods and
1
services. Economic growth also requires investment in physical capital—tools,
plants, and equipment. While a significant portion of investment is general
purpose, some is specific to particular relationships or contracts. For example, if
a factory receives an order for a particular kind of steel, it may need to order
particular supplies and to purchase or set up machine tools for that specific
purpose. In the most general sense, investment means spending now in return for
future gain. Economic growth requires sacrifice today for the sake of tomorrow.
Without investment, there can be no growth. This investment most often comes
from domestic sources, although foreign investment can play an important role.
Investment will only occur if investors are confident that they will profit.
Thus, investment is undermined if the government or a private party expropriates
the investment or the profits.2 Relationship-specific investments are undermined
if the purchaser does not pay.3 In most developed countries, constitutional
guarantees and powerful courts reduce the risk of expropriation. For example, in
4
the United States, the Takings Clause of the Constitution prevents the
government from seizing property without compensation. Courts with the power
to enjoin government action or award compensation enforce this protection.
Similarly, commercial law and reasonably impartial and efficient courts reduce
the risk of purchaser nonpayment. If a purchaser breaches a contract and refuses
to pay, the supplier can bring an action against the purchaser in court. The court
can then be relied upon to adjudicate the matter fairly. Court judgments are
generally respected and enforced. Of course, even in the most developed
countries, there are many problems. Courts are expensive. Judges or juries may
misinterpret the facts or the law. In addition, the losing party may be bankrupt or
otherwise evade enforcement. Nevertheless, the legal protection of property and
contractual rights is sufficient to encourage large amounts of investment. Judicial
independence is an important aspect of legal effectiveness in the developed
world. It ensures that courts do not favor the government in expropriation
disputes. After all, there is little value in a takings clause if the courts always side
with the government. Similarly, an independent judiciary provides assurance that
courts do not favor politically powerful or connected parties in contractual
disputes.

1. GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3rd ed. 1993).
2. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
3. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
4. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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Nevertheless, an independent court system is not the only mechanism for
protecting property rights and enforcing contracts. Governments can adopt
policies against expropriation that do not involve courts. One example is the
former Soviet Union. Even though it was ruled by the Communist Party, the
Soviet Union had a good reputation for protecting the property rights of foreign
investors.5 Those property rights were not protected by courts, and the judiciary
was certainly not independent. Nevertheless, because the ruling party decided
that foreign investment was necessary, investments were protected through
government restraint and other nonjudicial means.
Similarly, contract enforcement does not require adjudication by courts.
When parties repeatedly deal with each other, or when communities are tightknit, contracts may be respected because people fear retaliation and value their
reputations. Fear of a bad reputation, and the ensuing social or commercial
ostracism, can motivate people to honor their contracts, even when courts are
nonexistent or corrupt. Although enforcement based on reputation may sound
alien to those living in modern economies, it is a familiar part of everyday life.
For example, why does a law professor honor his promise to prepare a keynote
address? It certainly is not fear of a lawsuit. Instead, it is because professors
value their reputations among fellow academics and the legal community at
large.
In addition, even courts that lack independence can enforce contracts. A
judiciary that is subservient to the government in political cases might still render
impartial justice in ordinary commercial cases, especially when neither party is
politically connected. As Susan Franck and Dan Kolkey point out, arbitration can
also substitute for local adjudication because it allows parties to select private
judges known for their wisdom and impartiality.6
Finally, organizational form can substitute for contract. As Ronald Coase
pointed out in his Nobel-prize winning article, “The Nature of the Firm,”
business entities can choose between contract and command.7 Large, vertically
integrated firms do not need to rely as much on courts as small firms, which need
to “contract out” large parts of their business. Perhaps the weakness of the courts
can help explain the emergence of large, family-controlled conglomerates in
much of Asia, most notably the South Korean chaebol and Japanese koretsu.
Although other mechanisms may substitute for courts in protecting
investments (e.g., executive restraint, reputation, and vertical integration), these
substitutes are likely to be less effective, more costly, or more limited in their

5. POLITICAL RISK SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE (1986); Edward L. Glaeser et al.,
Do Institutions Cause Growth, 9 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 271, 276 (2004).
6. Don Kolkey, Address at the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Symposium on Judicial
Independence and Legal Infrastructure: Private Dispute Resolution and Economic Development, (Oct. 28,
2005); Susan Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337 (2007).
7. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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applicability. Government policies against expropriation can change quickly if
not backed by strong institutions. Reputational enforcement of contracts restricts
transactions to those with established track records, impedes new entry, and often
fosters ethnic, religious, political, or racial discrimination. More generally,
reliance on reputation impedes large-scale, impersonal exchange.8 Arbitration,
especially international arbitration, is impractical for small contracts between
domestic parties. In addition, the enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards ultimately depends on local courts.9 Vertically-integrated firms may be
less efficient than the smaller, more nimble firms that must rely more on courts
for contractual enforcement.
Although independent courts are usually viewed as a cause of economic
growth, the reverse may be true. Economic growth may begin without
independent courts, relying instead on governmental restraint and reputational
enforcement. Then, as economic growth proceeds, the problems described above
may become more acute. With more at risk, the possibility of executive
expropriation may become less acceptable to business owners. As businesses
grow in size, reliance on small groups of trading partners becomes more
problematic. Also, the political power of the commercial class may grow in
tandem with economic growth. In very poor societies, only military or religious
elites may have the power to pressure the government. As wealth increases,
private parties have more to offer the government and become more politically
powerful. As a result, as economic growth occurs, demand for independent courts
may increase and such demands are more likely to be heeded. China provides a
good example of this process. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese courts were
of notoriously poor quality. Nevertheless, China enjoyed an unprecedented
economic boom. More recently, as the economy has matured, demand for
improvement of the country's courts has become louder, both among domestic
businesses and foreign investors.10
The analogy between courts and roads, which is implicit in the concept of
judicial infrastructure, illustrates the difficulty of establishing causation.
Although a network of well-paved roads and highways would certainly facilitate
growth, few countries possess such infrastructure at early stages of their
economic development. Instead, growth begins with small vehicles on poorlypaved roads and dirt paths. As economic growth occurs, the inadequacies of the

8. Paul Milgrom, Douglass North & Barry Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:
The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champaign Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990); Francis
Delaey, Enforcing Contracts in Transition Countries, in LAW IN TRANSITION: CONTACT ENFORCEMENT 20-21
(AUTUMN 2001).
9. Don Kolkey, TRANS. LAW.__(forthcoming 2007); Franck, supra note 6.
10. Jing Liu, Address at the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Symposium on Judicial
Independence and Legal Infrastructure: The Role of Judicial Independence, (Oct. 28, 2005); Wang Juan,
Address at the University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Symposium on Judicial Independence and
Legal Infrastructure: The Role of Judicial Independence, (Oct. 28, 2005); Conversation with Laura W. Young,
Wang & Wang, LLP (October 28, 2005).
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transportation system become more apparent. Bigger businesses seek to use
larger trucks, and the production of higher-value products makes transport delays
more costly. Thus, business demands better roads. Growth also provides the
resources for better infrastructure. A poor country cannot afford high-quality
roads, but after some growth, they become affordable.
Thus, causation is likely to be complex. Neither independent courts nor
paved roads are necessary for economic growth, but economic growth is likely to
increase demand for both. In turn, improvement in the quality of roads and courts
is likely to facilitate increases in growth, which will further increase demand for
improvements in legal and physical infrastructure.
III. EMPIRICAL WORK ON COURTS, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
In recent years, there has been a flurry of research on the relationship
11
between courts and economic growth. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to
measure judicial quality. Judicial independence is often used as a proxy for the
quality of a court system, but it is obviously imperfect. Recent interest in this line
of research has been sparked in large part by a series of papers by economists
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, joined in some
papers by Edward Glaeser, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Robert Vishny.
The first two papers by this set of researchers—Legal Determinants of External
Finance and Law and Finance—examine the impact of investor protection and legal
origin on the strength of capital markets in forty-nine countries.12 They find that
countries with strong investor protection and common-law legal origin have stronger
equity markets. These articles do not, however, analyze judicial independence or
other measures of court quality (aside from common-law origin), nor do they
investigate effects on economic growth. Of course, there is presumably some
relationship between strong capital markets and economic growth, but these articles
never use economic growth as a dependent variable.
A later paper, Judicial Checks and Balances, examines the impact of judicial
independence and other institutions on the protection of rights in 71 countries.13
Countries with independent judiciaries are more likely to have strong protections
for property, political, and human rights. Again, there is no direct analysis of
economic growth or economic performance more generally, although it is

11. This article focuses on more recent, quantitative literature. There is also quite a bit of
nonquantitative work on the subject. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT (Edguardo
Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997); Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East
Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829 (2000); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A
Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999); Amanda Perry, Effective Legal Systems and
Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of the Evidence, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 779 (2000).
12. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La
Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
13. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004).
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plausible that protection of private rights would encourage growth. In addition,
causation is unclear. The evidence presented is consistent with the view that
increased private rights cause judicial independence, as well as the idea that some
other factor, perhaps education, leads to both increased private rights and judicial
independence.14 Finally, as discussed below, the measurement of judicial
independence is very problematic.15
In Do Institutions Cause Growth, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, and
16
Shleifer directly address the causation question. They find no connection
between judicial independence and economic growth. More generally, there is no
connection between institutions, such as constraints on the executive, and
economic growth. Instead, education is the most important determinant of
economic growth. Most countries that emerged from poverty started as
dictatorships with few institutional protections. Sound economic policies, such as
protection of private property, resulted from ruler choice rather than institutional
constraints. As countries grew richer, they improved their institutions (e.g.,
granted independence to their judiciaries and imposed constitutional restraints on
the executive). This, they argue, was the history of most of Western Europe, and
can be observed most recently in the Pacific Rim, especially Taiwan and South
Korea.
Although this last article is the most informative so far, it has several problems.
First, the authors analyze judicial independence data from only 1995. The most
powerful test in the article is the relationship between constraints on the executive
and economic growth from 1960 and 2000. Because they find a positive relationship
between growth and constraints on the executive in 2000, but not in 1960, the
authors conclude that constraints on the executive do not cause economic growth;
rather, the reverse may be true. But, they did not perform equivalent tests for judicial
independence because the authors did not have data for judicial independence in
1960. The article thus lacked a good test for the causal relationship between judicial
independence and economic growth.
In addition, the authors use a crude, idiosyncratic measure of judicial
independence based on two factors: (1) whether judges of the highest courts have life
tenure; and (2) whether “judicial decisions are a source of law.”17 The first factor is
very simplistic because it ignores the tenure of lower court judges and numerous
other factors, such as salaries and promotion practices that affect judicial
independence. The second factor, whether “judicial decisions are a source of law,” is
irrelevant to judicial independence. The authors seek to justify this factor by arguing
14. The authors recognize this problem and argue that “judicial independence is to a significant extent a
feature of colonial transplantation, and as such is likely to be causal.” Id. at 465. This is plausible, but without
detailed investigation into the history of judicial independence (i.e., whether it is, in fact, a feature of
transplantation rather than choice), it remains merely a conjecture.
15. Glaeser et al., supra note 5. For a critique of this article, see K. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson,
James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, From Education to Democracy? 95 AM. ECON. REV. 44 (2005).
16. Glaeser et al., supra note 5.
17. Id. at 300.
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that “the binding power of precedent checks the ability of the sovereign to influence
judges in specific instances,”18 but one could easily argue that judiciaries in countries
without a strong doctrine of precedent are equally constrained by detailed codes.
A study by Feld and Voigt develops more sophisticated measures of judicial
independence.19 They distinguish between de jure and de facto independence. The
former comprises twelve variables, including life tenure and appointment by
professionals, while the latter is composed of eight factors, including the average
length of actual judicial service, whether salaries have been eroded by inflation, and
how often laws relating to courts have been changed. The authors examine the
relationship between judicial independence and economic growth in fifty-seven
countries. They find that de jure independence is not related to economic growth, but
that de facto independence is. Unfortunately, because the measurement periods for
the independent and dependent variables overlap—de facto judicial independence
was measured from 1960-2000 and economic growth was measured from 1990-98—
the study cannot fully distinguish between causation and correlation.
An article by Paul Mahoney and I takes a different approach, looking at change
over time in a single country—England in the eighteenth century.20 Unlike other
articles discussed here, we did not look at dozens of countries with a variety of
confounding cultures and political systems. Further, this approach did not take
snapshots of different countries at one point in time, but instead looked at change
over time.
As a result of the Glorious Revolution in 1688, England began to grant its
judiciary more independence. We tried to examine the impact of these changes on
the economy. Unfortunately, we could not examine the impact on economic growth
directly because good high-frequency data on growth from this period was lacking,
and even if such data existed, it would be difficult to disentangle the effect of judicial
independence from the effect of the many other institutional changes enacted during
that time. Instead, we looked at effects on equity prices.
England has had a flourishing stock market since the 1690s, and surviving
contemporary newspapers recorded daily prices. Because this market, like modern
ones, responded quickly to news, we could isolate the effect of judicial independence
from the effect of other institutional changes by looking at price movements the day
before, day of, and day after important legislative actions, (that related to judicial
independence—introduction of legislation, amendment of legislation, votes on
legislation, etc.). We found that improvements in judicial independence were

18. La Porta, supra note 13, at 451. The data on judicial independence used in Do Institutions Cause
Growth is the same as that used in Judicial Checks and Balances, and is described more fully in the latter.
Because the two articles use the same measures of judicial independence, the critique in the text applies also to
Judicial Checks and Balances.
19. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence
Using a New Set of Indicators, 19 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497 (2003); see also Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Making
Judges Independent—Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1260, 2004).
20. Daniel Klerman & Paul Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence, 7 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1
(2005).
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associated with increases in equity values. In particular, legislation granting life
tenure was associated with a 10% increase in stock prices, while other changes,
including increases in judicial salaries, were associated with smaller increases. Of
course, there are problems with this approach. The stock market measures
contemporary perceptions and predictions of economic impact, and not actual
impact. In addition, England’s economic development may have differed from that
of other countries. Further the relationship between judicial independence and
economic growth may be different today than it was 300 years ago.
IV. FUTURE RESEARCH
There obviously is a vast potential for future work. For example, one could
improve upon the analysis of Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, and Shleifer by
collecting data on judicial independence in 1960, and analyzing its impact on
economic growth in the period from 1960 to 2000. One could also build upon Feld
and Voigt’s analysis by using different data on de facto judicial independence.
Reports compiled by the American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative (“ABA-CEELI”) might provide a rich vein of data for this purpose,
21
albeit one that is restricted, at least at present, to only sixteen countries. Finally, the
analysis that Paul Mahoney and I performed could be extended to other countries and
perhaps even to individual American states. With a larger sample of countries, it
might also be possible to use economic growth as a dependent variable in addition to
equity returns.
In conclusion, economic theory suggests that effective, independent courts
promote investment and economic growth. Nevertheless, independent courts may not
be necessary for growth, because executive constraint and reputational contract
enforcement may be adequate substitutes. If growth starts without a solid judicial
infrastructure, economic growth may cause demand for quality courts. The empirical
literature provides some support for the idea that independent courts encourage
economic growth, but causation remains unclear and much work remains to be done.

21.
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